Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 10
Issue 1 Fall 1992

Article 4

September 1992

Private Property Investment, Lucas and the Fairness Doctrine
John R. Nolon
Pace University School of Law, jnolon@law.pace.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr

Recommended Citation
John R. Nolon, Private Property Investment, Lucas and the Fairness Doctrine, 10 Pace Envtl. L.
Rev. 43 (1992)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Volume 10

Fall 1992

Number 1

Private Property Investment, Lucas and
the Fairness Doctrine
John R. Nolon*
I. Looking at Both Sides of the "Takings" Issue
In a recent visit to the campus of Pace Law School, Jerold Kayden, a Senior Fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy, paid this institution a worthy compliment. After working with us for a time, he noted, with favor, that our property
and land use faculty members are in close touch with our environmentalists. I imagine that Mr. Kayden respects this cooperation because it mirrors the type of collaboration between
property rights defenders and environmental advocates that
ought to be taking place in society generally.
Unfortunately, conferences and conversations on the Lu* Mr. Nolon is the Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor at Pace Law School
in White Plains, New York, where he teaches and writes in the areas of land use,
property, environmental regulation and real estate transactions and finance. He has
published a book on residential development for McGraw-Hill, served on BNA's editorial board for the Housing and Development Reporter and advises on rural and
urban development in Latin America. B.A. University of Nebraska 1963; J.D. University of Michigan 1966.
My thanks to Eyleen Hawkins, my research assistant, for her help in organizing
these colloquium remarks for presentation here. Some of the points explored here
have been incorporated into an article on regulatory takings law that was published
in the JOURNAL OF LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, Vol. 8, No. 1, September
1992. It is entitled: Footprintson The Shifting Sands of The Isle of Palms, A Practical Analysis of Regulatory Takings Cases.
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casi case tend to be confrontational rather than collaborative.
Worse, the property rights and environmental movements employ "spin masters" to turn the case to their advantage to the
considerable confusion of property owners and regulators who
are trying in earnest to understand the Supreme Court's view
on the matter. In the interests of looking at the issues from
both sides at this colloquium, let me enter the discussion from
the perspective of the property owner. These remarks are not
intended to advocate the interests of the new property rights
movement. In fact, those advocates will be disappointed by
what I say. Rather, I aspire to view the issue of real property
regulation as broadly as possible, reaching beyond the jurisprudence of regulatory takings cases into the realms of real
estate transactions law and comprehensive land use planning.
II.

Inherent Property Rights

The recent emergence of an aggressive property rights
movement, a counterpoint in the 1990's to the aggressive environmental rights movement of the 1970's, is due in large part
to the perceived over-regulation of property. The language
used by judges, journalists and commentators signals the arrival of this interest group on the regulatory scene and reflects,
to an extent, its sentiments. For example, one recent law review article discussing the impact of regulations on property
values is entitled "Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices."2
Justice Scalia saw in the facts of the Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission case an "out-and-out plan of extortion. ' '
The New York Times recently characterized the forces behind
the plethora of cases that challenge regulations as takings
under the Fifth Amendment as a property rights "movement."' The Washington Post wrote that these forces are "an
1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), rev'g and
remanding, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
2. Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices:Changing the Presumption of Constitutionalityin the Wake of the "Takings Trilogy," 44 ARK. L. REV.
65 (1991).
3. 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).
4. Keith Schneider, Environment Laws Face a Stiff Test from Landowners, N.Y.
TrmEs, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al.
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increasingly militant property rights movement."
There is additional evidence that a major assault on property regulation is underway. The Spokesmen for the Alliance
for America, a recently formed organization chartered to fight
environmental laws, called the environmental movement an
"evil empire," using such terms to elicit contributions to their
campaign.' The Wise Use Movement, a grassroots coalition of
250 groups, asserts that private property owners should be allowed to use their land as they see fit. The Heritage Foundation sees in the U.S. Constitution an inherent property right.
In a recent Issue Bulletin (No. 173), the Foundation wrote
that: "Each American correctly considers it her or his birthright to be free to acquire land on which to build a home or to
use however she or he sees fit, so long as this use does not
interfere physically with the rights of neighbors." '7 Such organizations are becoming more unified as a result of their fundraising and lobbying efforts, and they are achieving wide notoriety due to the media attention they actively seek and
receive.
Jennifer Nedelsky, in her book Private Property and the
Limits of American Constitutionalism,attributes to the founders of the federal republic a deep interest in the protection of
private property.8 She postulates that the security of property
was integral to the economic and political success of the new
nation. She writes that "[i]f property could not be protected,
not only prosperity, but liberty, justice and the international
strength of the nation would ultimately be destroyed."
Nedelsky also argues that the "focus on property as the paradigmatic right to be insulated from the democratic process
created a general notion of rights as natural and uncontested
5. Kirstin Downey, A Conservative Supreme Court Addresses Property Rights,
WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1992, at HI.
6. Timothy Egan, Fund-Raisers Top Anti-Environmentalism, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
9, 1991, at A18.
7. William G. Laffer III, The Private Property Rights Act: ForcingFederal Regulators to Obey the Bill of Rights, HERITAGE FOUND. REP. Iss. BULL. 173 (1992), at 13.
8. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM:

THE

MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY

(1990).

9. Laura S. Underkauffler, The Perfidity of Property, 70 TEx. L. REV. 293, 299
(1991) (citing NEDELSKY, supra note 8, at 6).
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in nature."1 0 She adds: "property was treated as a sacred
value that required protection, not evaluation.""1
III.

Flexible Definition of Property

Whether a property right exists that is immune from police power regulation is a much-debated topic. Despite the
amount of energy expended to uncover such a right, no case
has ever identified it in any quantifiable or irreducible form.
The evidence that such efforts are in vain is considerable.
In 1878, Professor von Jhering wrote "there is no absolute
property, i.e., property that is freed from taking into consideration the interests of the community, and history has taken
care to inculcate this truth into all peoples."1 2 In his book
Real Property,Powell notes that a property owner "must expect to find the absoluteness of his property rights curtailed
by the organs of society, for the promotion of the best interests of others for whom these organs also operate as protective
agencies."1 Professor John Cribbet writes that: "[I]t is still
incorrect to say that the judiciary protects property. Rather,
the judiciary calls property that which they protect, and that
which they protect is forever in transition." '
These authors believe that the regulation of property
rights will increase as the complexity of society increases.
Powell notes that "[tihe necessity for such curtailments is
greater in a modern industrialized and urbanized society than
it was in the relatively simple American society of 50, 100, or
200 years ago."1 5 Cribbet agrees:
As our concepts of property have evolved, the balance has
shifted from an excessive emphasis on individual rights
toward a greater dominance of the social interest.
10. Id. at 300 (citing NEDELSKY, supra note 8, at 184-85).
11. Id. (citing NEDELSKY, supra note 8, at 186).
12. R. VON JHERING, DER GEIST DES ROMISHEN RlCHTS AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN.
STUFFEN SEINER ENTWICKLANG 7 (4th
13. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, §

ed. 1878).
745, at 493 (1970).

14. John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property, 1 U. ILL. L. REV. 41 (1986).
15. 5 POWELL, supra note 13, at 493.
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Whether this has been altogether a good and wise shift..
• has been, and will be, the subject of much debate. The
fact that a shift has occurred, however, is difficult to
deny.16
IV.

The Need for Collaboration

The balance between individualism and dominance of the
social interest is at the core of Professor Cribbet's recent writing and fairly characterizes the exploration of the U.S. Supreme Court in recent regulatory takings cases.17 Lucas is
among a number of cases that have ferreted out overreaching
regulations and warned regulators not to engage in such excesses. Since there is no fixed definition of what property is,
both sides of the debate should concern themselves with the
proper balance between the freedom to use as the owner sees
fit and society's need to regulate that use in the community's
interest. It is in achieving this balance, not in a search for fundamental constitutional principles, that the interests of both
sides will be protected and the case law can be understood. All
of this amounts to a call for collaboration in regulating property only as far as necessary to protect legitimate public
objectives; collaboration of the type Jerold Kayden lauded at
Pace Law School.
The dangers of not collaborating to find a reasonable balance between property rights and the public interest clearly
are visible in recent legislative initiatives that respond to the
lobbying of the property rights movement. The Private Property Rights Act of 1991,16 which was supported by the Bush
administration but not adopted by Congress, would have subjected all federal regulations to a "takings impact analysis"
and constrained the issuance of needed and useful environmental regulations. 9 At least thirteen states - Alabama, Ari16.
17.
(1982);
Coastal
18.
19.

Cribbet, supra note 14, at 42.
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 825
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Nollan v. California
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
The Private Property Rights Act of 1991, S. 50, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Id.
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zona, California, Delaware, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Vermont
and Washington - have recently considered property rights
legislation in one or both of their legislative houses. These
proposals either require state agencies to conduct takings impact analyses prior to the issuance of new regulations or they
define a compensable.taking and require payment for diminutions in property value if a use-restricting regulation is
enacted.
Such legislative proposals are less likely to succeed if the
need for them is not felt by lawmakers. This need is less likely
to be felt if regulators proceed fairly, giving the impact of
their regulations on property owners the type of consideration
that would be mandated by these proposed statutes. More importantly, regulations that intrude on such uses only as far as
necessary to accomplish their environmental or other public
objectives are less vulnerable to invalidation in the courts by
judges trained to respect private rights as well as legislative
discretion.
If this call to maximum fairness in regulations is ignored,
regulators run the risk of offending the sensibility of the legislators and judges and having their regulations scrutinized
more rigorously. If a regulation is designed to be fair, the
Court's "sense of justice" is less likely to be offended. Sensing
fairness, the Court is less likely to conclude that the takings
clause is implicated, and will tend to adopt a deferential posture in reviewing the regulation in question. Legislators, sensing fairness in regulatory regimes, will be less moved by their
propertied constituents to limit the discretion of regulatory
agencies.
V. Private Market Obstacles to the Development of the
Lucas Lots
A.

The Capacity of the Lucas Lots to be Developed

An exploration of the reasonableness of the South Carolina regulation that prevented David Lucas from building any
permanent structures on his two beach front lots should begin, like a buyer's due diligence analysis of the property, with
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/4
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an examination of its inherent characteristics and its suitability for development.
The Isle of Palms, where these lots are located, is a highly
dynamic area. Its shoreline is a shifting one. The shifts are
due to wave action and tidal currents in an inlet between the
Isle of Palms and an island to its north. Currents carry sand
from this northern island into the inlet, where the sand collects in bars or shoals. If the inlet channel shifts, as it does
periodically, shoals can break off and move toward the Isle of
Palms, creating sand bars. These masses can cause waves to
bend around their edges, causing erosion on the Island on either side. Since the late 1940's, the shoreline of the Isle of
Palms, although generally moving seaward, has shifted occasionally as these currents have moved. Sometimes the shoreline has been 200 feet or more inland of its current position
seaward of the Lucas lots. During these times, the Lucas lots
have been under water; houses built on them would have been
flooded.
The State of South Carolina argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that, due to the unstable nature of the barrier
island, there was a high risk that structures and their occupants would be vulnerable to adverse weather conditions. As
borne out by Hurricane Hugo, extreme winds break up structures on barrier island beachfronts and carry them like projectiles onto adjacent areas; severe storms sever septic tanks and
sewer lines causing costly contamination of coastal waters.
The cost to the public for cleanup and relief following such
catastrophes is considerable.
Lucas owned an equity interest in the development company that had built homes on the Isle of Palms. He purchased
his two lots from that same company. As a licensed realtor
and property developer with experience in developing properties on the fragile barrier island where his land is located, he
should be charged with knowledge that the lots he purchased
were limited in their capacity to be developed and sold. This
is explained below by reference to prevailing trends in the
brokerage, insurance and mortgage fields that affect any home
builder, seller or purchaser in the area.
7
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Liability to Disclose Property Defects

The traditional property perspective in the purchase of
realty begins with the common law concept of caveat emptor,
"let the buyer beware." Upon purchase, the buyer accepts the
risk of all defects in the property. From this concept flows the
notion that purchasers of real property must conduct "due
diligence" analyses of properties before they buy. Should they
fail to do so, or to protect themselves from property defects in
the contract and deed, they have no subsequent claim against
the seller for conditions they should have discovered prior to
purchase. Having conducted such an analysis and purchased
the property, owners, in the vernacular of regulatory takings
cases, are said to have certain "reasonable investment-backed
expectations" in their purchase. Among the matters they
should have investigated is the regulatory environment affecting the land, its physical condition, and the availability of insurance and financing for their properties. Absent a contract
provision to the contrary, the seller takes no responsibility for
these matters subsequent to purchase. The buyer assumes this
risk and must carefully analyze the regulatory environment,
the business prospects for development and the physical characteristics of the property during the pre-purchase phase of
the transaction.
When a regulation that severely diminishes the property's
value is adopted after the contract to purchase is signed, the
buyer is in the position of the plaintiff in Stambovsky v. Ackley, a recent New York decision.2 0 The owner, Mrs. Ackley,
had created a local perception that the single-family house
Mr. Stambovsky had contracted to buy from her was haunted
by a jovial Revolution-era ghost. Mr. Stambovsky, unfamiliar
with local lore, found out about this reputation only after he
had signed the contract, but before the passing of title. The
court found that the contract was inequitable and should be
rescinded because the seller had created a condition that materially affected the property's value and that he could not,
despite due diligence, discover the defect. In the court's
20. 169 A.D.2d 254, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/4
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words, "Who you gonna' call?" to inspect for ghosts.2 1
Property rights advocates logically view the specter of
regulations that materially affect property values in this same
way, particularly when they are passed, as in Lucas, after
purchase. If "who you gonna' call?" applies, and there was no
notice of the need for the regulation, the purchaser may be
treated unfairly. But, when the inherent properties of the land
or patent environmental conditions in the area suggest the
need for limitations on the use of the property in the broad
public interest, the inequitable nature of the regulation
abates. Whether we, as a society, are in agreement as to
whether a buyer should expect regulation for environmental
reasons is the key question that plagues regulatory takings jurisprudence. There is considerable evidence emerging from
the context of real estate transactions law that buyers should
become more knowledgeable in this area.
As an active participant in the local real estate industry,
Lucas knew, or should have known, of the provisions of the
1977 South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act 22 which
placed prospective purchasers on notice of the nature of the
limitations on the development adjacent to the shoreline and
of the potential for future restrictions on that development.
The state, in fact, had appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission
to investigate these problems further and propose solutions to
them in 1986, before Mr. Lucas purchased his lots. The appointment of this Commission and its charge were well covered in the state and local press at the time.
In Stambovsky, the seller was not liable for the diminution of value; the contract was simply rescinded as inequitable.2 In New York, sellers are liable at law for damages for
their failure to disclose material property conditions only in a
few circumstances. Across the nation, however, this seems to
be changing. Sellers of residential properties, and their brokerage agents, are increasingly held liable for their failure to
disclose material defects that are not normally discoverable by
21. Id. at 257, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10 et. seq. (Law Co-op. 1987).
23. 169 A.D.2d 254, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991).

9
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2 " for example,
the average buyer. In Easton v. Strassburger,
the seller and broker were held liable for not disclosing certain
soil conditions that indicated a mud slide was imminent. The
purchaser of the single-family house on that lot was successful
in a damage action against them, after the home was totally
destroyed by a major soil movement that occurred soon after
25
he purchased the property.
Easton is a California case, followed recently by courts in
several other jurisdictions. Some estimates coming from the
brokerage insurance industry indicate that over two-thirds of
buyer's claims against brokers involve non-disclosure; the average insurance award in such cases has more than doubled
since 1984, when Easton was decided. Since 1984, six state
legislatures have passed bills requiring sellers to disclose property defects.2 6 By the end of 1993, such bills will be under
consideration in twenty-one state legislatures.2" Thirty-three
states have some form of voluntary disclosure and four others
are considering it.28 The judicial, legislative and market perspective on this matter is that the seller and the brokerage
agent are in a better position to discover and disclose latent
defects than the buyers - particularly the normally unsophisticated purchaser of a single-family home.
The fear of liability for non-disclosure has led, even in
states where the law does not require it, to the practice by
brokers of requiring their listing sellers to complete a full disclosure statement which is then passed along to the prospective buyer. Recently, Caldwell Banker announced that sellers
listing property with the national real estate brokerage company must fill out and sign property defect disclosure forms.
The 800,000-member National Association of Realtors recently announced plans to lobby lawmakers in all states that
do not have seller disclosure laws to pass them.2 9 Interestingly, the local practice among brokers in the Isle of Palms

24. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (lst Dist. 1984).
25. Id. at 105, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
26. James D. Lawlor, Seller Beware, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 90.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/4
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area is to require sellers to sign disclosure statements listing
defective conditions in their properties.
This trend among brokers is due, in part, to a canonical
duty that professional brokers have to discover and disclose
property defects. Under Article 9 of the Code of Ethics of the
National Association of Realtors, brokers are required to
"avoid exaggeration, misrepresentation, or concealment of
pertinent facts. ' 30 They are under an "affirmative obligation
to discover adverse factors that a reasonably competent and
diligent investigation would disclose."3 1 Brokers have been
disciplined by their Professional Standards Committee, for
example, for failing to discover and disclose to the buyer that
a home on a city block was not connected to the public sewer
system. 2
Mr. Lucas claimed at trial that his intention was to develop houses on the two lots. He had engaged an architect to
draw plans and planned to sell at least one of the houses in
the private market. In South Carolina, this sale is affected by
a state statute that recognizes seller responsibility to disclose
physical deficiencies. A bill which became effective in 1990
frees sellers and brokers from disclosing psychological defects
of real property, while affirming their duty to disclose material
defects: "This section does not relieve an owner or agent of an
obligation to disclose the physical condition of the
premises."33
Where there are recent movements in the soil, as in Easton and in Lucas, and given the seller's duty to disclose them
to potential buyers, the property's marketability and market
value are questionable. This is true, despite the fact that, in
recent years, beachfront lots on the Isle of Palms have been
selling. These sales are due primarily to the availability of
government-sponsored property insurance programs, and
there is some evidence, now discoverable by purchasers, that
30.

NATIONAL ASS'N OF REALTORS, CODE OF ETHICS

(1982).

31. Id.
32. Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 101 n.6, 199 Cal. Rep. 383, 389
n.6 (1st Dist. 1984).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-270 (Law Co-op. 1990) (previously 1990 Act No. 481,
§1, effective May 14, 1990).
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these programs are being rethought, particularly insofar as
they encourage construction in high-risk areas.
C.

Availability of Insurance and Mortgage Financing

A bill that passed the House of Representatives in 1991,
by a margin of 388 to 17, would eliminate flood insurance for
new construction of homes in erosion hazard areas."4 The
House received testimony that severe coastal storms could
cost the federal treasury billions of dollars because of its current obligations under this program. 5 Payments due to Hurricane Hugo, a single event, cost federal taxpayers over $300
million. 6 There was also testimony before the House that the
existence of the insurance program was singularly responsible
for much of the development of housing in. coastal areas such
37
as the Isle of Palms.
Private market flood and storm-risk insurance in such areas, where it can be obtained, carries yearly premiums approaching 10% of a home's value - a prohibitive amount.
Private market insurance companies in the Isle of Palms area
do not provide insurance at all for homes built within 1000
feet of the high tide line. This area of disability includes the
Lucas lots. It also includes the set back zone in which development was prevented by the 1988 Beachfront Management
Act contested in the Lucas case.
The South Carolina legislature created the Windstorm
and Hail Insurance Underwriting Association and mandated
membership in it by insurance companies writing property insurance in the state. Members must participate in the Association's shared-risk pool, which is the only source, other than
federal flood insurance, of storm-related casualty insurance in
the 1000-foot zone of disability designated by the private
34. National Flood Insurance Compliance Mitigation and Erosion Management
Act, H.R. 1050, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
35. Cornelia Dean, Beachfront Owners Face Possible Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
1992, at Al.
36. National Underwriter Co. Property & Casualty/Risk & Benefits Management
Edition, Flood Plan Pays a Record $365M in S.C. Hugo Losses, at 35 (Oct. 22, 1990).
37. Dean, supra note 35, at Al.
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companies themselves. Presumably, the state legislature could
act to limit its insurance requirements, leaving beachfront developers in high risk areas no method of obtaining casualty
insurance. There is no evidence that the state legislature is
inclined to do so, but it is noteworthy that the entire South
Carolina congressional delegation voted in favor of H.R. 1236
that would have eliminated flood insurance coverage for new
construction in high-risk areas. It is also interesting that some
property rights groups, such as the Heritage Foundation and
the Cato Institute, have joined the environmental lobby in opposing government-sponsored property insurance in areas
deemed by the private market to be unduly risky.
If property insurance for storm-related risks is not obtainable by buyers, they cannot obtain private market construction or permanent loans for their properties. Conventional mortgage lenders in the Isle of Palms market area will
not finance property purchase or development unless evidence
of property insurance is provided as part of an application for
such finance. Because of these customs and practices in the
unregulated private market, most lots in this area of disability
would not be developed but for the availability of government-sponsored insurance programs.
D.

Legitimate Investment-Backed Expectation

The judgment of the unregulated private market in the
Isle of Palms seems to be that beachfront construction is a
doubtful, high risk business venture. Developers in the area
would argue that development is encouraged and enabled by
government-sponsored insurance programs that were available
when they purchased beachfront lots and are available today. 8 Over time, however, buyers conducting due diligence investigations may conclude that these government programs
are not reliable and that potential changes in them may impugn the ability of owners to develop or market their proper38. Between January, 1990 and August, 1992, for example, 54 beachfront lots
were sold on the Isle of Palms. Thirty of them were vacant; they sold for an average
price of just over $250,000. Twenty-four of them were developed as single-family lots;
their average sales price was just over $500,000.

13
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ties in the future. 9
The judgment of the private market - the realtors, the
insurance industry, and mortgage lenders - is that the type
of permanent construction that is prevented by the Beachfront Management Act at issue in the Lucas case is a highrisk venture. In regulatory takings terms, Mr. Lucas, as a purchaser of beachfront lots, may not have "reasonable investment-backed expectations" that sustain the considerable price
he paid.40 If his expectations were reasonable, at the time of
purchase, would a purchaser from him today have defensible
investment-backed expectations? If not, should the taxpayers
bear the burden of this change in society's view of the wisdom
of developing on the beach? These transactional considerations are critical to the issue of the essential fairness of the
regulation as well as to assessing how much of a loss Mr. Lucas suffered because of it.4 1
E.

The Wisdom
Discretion

of Judicial

Usurpation

of Legislative

These facts raise an interesting question of whether the
limitations on development imposed by the regulation chal39. Additional evidence of the private market's adjustment to the new realities
of beachfront development on barrier islands can be seen in the plans underway on
Dewees Island immediately northeast of the Isle of Palms. One hundred and fifty
homes are being sold on this 1200-acre island. The community, which will be deedrestricted to guarantee no further development, is being marketed as a "no negative
impact development." Privately imposed setback restrictions on beachfront lots range
from about 450 feet to 700 feet. The 150 homes are served by only three miles of road
of natural sand base construction. Vehicles are limited to golf carts and small electricpowered cars.
40. Was Lucas's decision to buy these lots reasonable if it was based on the continuing availability of costly government-sponsored insurance programs? If the answer is yes, does this indirectly oblige government to continue programs that its taxpayers cannot afford?
41. In its order on .remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that
there exists no common law basis to justify the prohibition of all development of the
Lucas lots. In remanding the case to the circuit level, the Court held that Mr. Lucas's
damages shall be limited to those actually "sustained as a result of his being temporarily deprived of the use of his property." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
1992 WL 358097, at *2 (S.C. Nov. 20, 1992).
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lenged in Lucas "inhere in the title [of the property] itself, ' 42
as the majority decision required, not because of common-law
nuisance limitations, but due to local industry practices,
shaped by prevailing legal considerations in the unregulated
private market. 43 A corollary question is whether the elimination of these government-sponsored insurance programs
would constitute a "newly legislated" limitation on development of the type Justice Scalia says legislatures may not pass
without compensation, if their effect is to deny all productive
use of the land. Simply stating these queries raises obvious
questions about the wisdom of judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives in these complex and interrelated areas of
society.
The federal and state legislatures collaborated in regulating development in coastal areas through the passage of complementary statutes: the Coastal Zone Management Act and
the Beachfront Management Act. If they can collaborate in
eliminating government-sponsored insurance programs that
enable most of the development in high-risk areas along
coastal beaches, should the court constrain their ability to regulate such development by the more direct means contested
in the Lucas case?
VI.

The Nuisance Law Limitation on Total Takings

The Court in Lucas held that the regulation, since it took
all value, is a taking requiring compensation unless development of the lots could have been prevented under the common law nuisance doctrines of South Carolina. There is considerable irony in this reliance on the common law of nuisance
in Lucas. We were instructed in 1970 by New York's highest
state court that litigation under nuisance doctrines was not
competent to resolve the broad geographical impacts of air
pollution and similar matters. 44 The court wrote:
42. 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
43. Id. at 2901.
44. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 N.E.2d
870 (1970).

15

58

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

A court should not try to do this on its own as a byproduct of private litigation and it seems manifest that
the judicial establishment is neither equipped in the limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to lay down and implement an effective policy for
the elimination of air pollution. This is an area beyond
the circumference of one private lawsuit. It is a direct responsibility for government and should not thus be undertaken as an incident to solving a dispute between
property owners and a single cement plant - one of
many - in the Hudson Valley. 5
This judicial sentiment is not limited to the courts in
New York. A recent Florida decision reviewing the establishment of a coastal construction control line, affecting particularly the development of the barrier islands, contains this
statement:
Evaluation of the economic, environmental, and geophysical concerns underlying the wisdom and desirability of so
regulating land use along the Florida beaches is, however
a political matter for determination by the legislature, not
this court. The setting of a truly desirable and effective
coastal construction control line along almost any segment of the Florida coastline will inevitably involve
mixed consideration of scientific knowledge and political
'
concerns. e
The irony arises in comparing the above language to that

of Justice Scalia in Lucas:
Any limitation so severe [as a total taking] cannot be
newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but
must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no more
45. Id. at 223, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314,.257 N.E.2d at 871.
46. Island Harbor Beach Club, Ltd. v. Department of Natural Resources, 495 So.
2d 209, 223-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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than duplicate the result that could have been achieved
in the courts - by adjacent landowners (or other
uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary
power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally,
47
or otherwise.

By defining nuisance by reference to the case law, the
Court has left the legislature little, if any, ability to regulate
in its discretion. Under Boomer, New York's highest court declared its incompetence to handle matters involving broad geographical impacts such as air pollution and, one would suppose, coastal protection. There is a worrisome Catch-22
situation here, a gap in logic and strategy that protects the
property owner from a total taking, leaving the communitarian interest in critical environmental protection in the breach.
An interesting question is whether the U.S. Supreme
Court, under its Lucas test, would include within the State's
"law of property" its seller disclosure doctrine and the customs and practices of the mortgage and insurance industries,
which are shaped by prevailing legal considerations. If so, and
if such practices discourage or prevent construction on the
Lucas lots, there may be no "taking" under the rule articulated in Lucas, even when no productive use of the land is left
to its owner.
In this context, the options available to the state in protecting its taxpayers and citizens from the growing expense
and hazard of coastal erosion and violent winds amount to a
sort of governmental Sophie's choice. South Carolina can prohibit development in close proximity to the beach, and risk
having to compensate affected owners under Lucas. This risk
is heightened because of the arrested development of the common law of nuisance as discussed above. Or, the state and federal governments can eliminate their insurance programs and
transfer these costs to the affected property owners, a crushing burden for an important group of constituents. Alternatively, state and federal lawmakers can choose to continue
47. 112 S. Ct. at 2900 (emphasis added).
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these insurance programs, imposing the cost of compensation
on the insurance companies required to participate in the
state-mandated windstorm pool and on federal taxpayers
under the federal flood insurance program.
The costs associated with property damage due to coastal
erosion alone are staggering. Recent analysis of this country's
coastlines indicates that 90% of the shoreline along the Gulf
and Atlantic coasts is eroding. The predicted rise in sea level
attributed to global warming is now one foot in the next century, which will cause a retreat in the coastline of South Carolina of 200 feet. Estimates in North Carolina indicate that up
to 5,000 existing structures may be lost to coastal erosion over
the next sixty years. 48 Add to this the billions of dollars lost in
hurricanes Andrew and Hugo,4' 9 and the ramifications of this
choice can be appreciated. In the face of such statistics, policies that discourage or prevent new construction of beachfront
homes seems eminently wise. Not surprisingly, such policies
coincide with emerging trends in the private real estate
marketplace.
The complexity of all this bolsters the point of those who
argue that the resolution of these issues ought to be left to the
legislature, where all interest groups are heard, rather than to
the courts, where only the interests of the litigants are articulated and resolved. This complexity also blunts the complaints of those who criticize the Court for failing to articulate
a bright-line rule applicable to all takings cases. All of this
calls on interests groups to collaborate to resolve these conflicts in the broader best interests of society rather than seek
individual remedies in the highly adversarial context of cases
brought before the bench.

48. Dennis J. Hwang, Shoreline Setback Regulations and the Takings Analysis,
13 U. HAW. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1991).
49. Peter Kerr, Insurers Prepare to Seek Rate Raises After Disasters , N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, at p.1. It is estimated that Hurricane Andrew caused $10.2 billion of damage in Florida and $500 million in Louisiana; Iniki caused $1.6 billion in
damage in Hawaii. Prior to this year's storm, Hurricane Hugo, in 1989, was the nation's costliest storm, causing $4.2 billion in damage. Id.
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VII.

Applicability of Lucas

The wording of the decision of Lucas itself confines it to
regulatory takings cases that are "relatively rare."' Other
than creating an important nuisance and property law irony, I
believe that the case does very little that is new and has limited applicability to the regulatory takings debate generally.
The decision quite possibly doesn't even resolve the dispute
between David Lucas and the South Carolina Coastal Council,
as the above analysis illustrates.
My understanding of this field of law is that the Court
tends to confine its holdings to similar types of fact situations.
I call the types of disputes, like Lucas, in which regulations
are rather summarily set aside by the Court, "undue burden"
cases. In the Court's analysis, the regulation challenged in
these cases goes beyond a reasonable police power limitation
on property use and implicates the protection of property
contained in the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation
Clause.
VIII.

How Do Courts Decide Regulatory Takings Cases?

The frustration of regulators and property owners with
the flexibility that judges have retained in the regulatory takings field is considerable. The jurisprudence of takings law has
been described variously by respected commentators as "untidy and confused," "somewhat illogical," "a muddle," "a
crazy-quilt pattern,". "open-ended and standardless," "chaotic," and "mystifying and incoherent." Is the sum of this that
regulators and property owners are subject to the whim of
judges who simply decide cases according to their life experience? Karl Llewellyn argued that judges are guided by constraining principles and techniques, but that they also have
leeway in deciding cases, particularly where social values are
in flux."1 He suggested that the facts lead judges to classify a
dispute and that from that classification they search for the
50. 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
51. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM INAMERICA 99 (Paul Gewirtz ed.
& Michael Ansald; trans., 1989).
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applicable rules of law.
A.

Categories of Takings

In the regulatory takings field there are four categories of
fact patterns, which I classify as arbitration cases, undue burden cases, public values cases, and public injury cases. These
categories can be illustrated by reviewing the opinions of the
majority and dissent in the South Carolina State Supreme
Court decision in Lucas and the majority decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court written by Justice Scalia.
B.

The Categories of Takings in Lucas

The majority of the South Carolina Supreme Court read
the Beachfront Management Act, and its prohibition of development on the Lucas lots as intending to protect a critical
natural resource and to prevent serious public injury.5 2 The
dissent, sympathetic to the complete destruction of market
value, saw a legislature promoting tourism and preserving natural habitats for wildlife. In this, "the most perplexing area of
American land use law," each side had at its disposal rules of
law on which to rely to vindicate its sense of justice.5 3
This state court debate illustrates two categories of "fact
situations" in the regulatory takings field. The majority
sensed that the legislature was preventing a great public harm
and placed the case in a group of cases where the primary
objective of the regulation is the prevention of public injury:
the Public Injury Category. The dissent believed that the legislature was regulating to secure laudable public benefits,
short of preventing noxious or offensive uses of land: the Public Values Category.
The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas placed
these same facts in yet a third category. Since the regulation
took all economically beneficial use, the "historical compact"
contained in the takings clause may have been violated. Such
52. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
53. Id. at 903 (quoting Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington, Now
You See It, Now You Don't, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 339 (1989)).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/4

20

1992]

LUCAS COLLOQUIUM

fact patterns constitute the "undue burden" category of cases,
so labeled because the Court concludes that one or more individual owners of property have been singled out to bear a
public burden that should be shouldered more broadly.
These three categories cover those controversies that our
society debates the most: the "growth area of the law," to use
Llewellyn's term, where societal values are in flux and great
debate of the type generated by Lucas is occurring. The more
settled category of disputes involves regulations that adjust
the benefits and burdens of economic life in a manner that
secures an average reciprocity of advantage to everyone concerned. The perception is that such regulations fairly arbitrate
the obligations and rights of citizenship and ownership; they
can be placed in a group of cases called the Arbitration Category, a class that represents the "stable core" (Llewellyn's
term) of regulatory takings law, about which there is less social conflict and confusion in the law. Zoning ordinances are a
classical example of such arbitration regulations.
In these categories of cases, there are some constraints on
the judiciary and some leeways. Within each category, judges
seem constrained. First, they are committed to search for fundamental fairness in the challenged regulation. Second, they
make two demands of all regulations, following the Agins"
prescription: the regulation must substantially advance a legitimate public interest and must not take all economically viable use of the property from the owner.58 Third, judges will
not question or lightly set aside a legislative finding that a
particular objective is a legitimate subject justifying public
regulation of private rights. Fourth, in determining whether
the property owner is unfairly burdened, they will look for
reciprocity of advantage and whether similar properties are
treated in the same way. Finally, they will put the initial burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the regulation on the
challenger. This burden is easily borne, in the undue burden
category, where the owner can show that she has suffered an
invasion of her possession or has no value left.
54. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
55. Id. at 260.
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In other ways, judges are provided leeways that they are
more likely to use where they sense that relatively few owners
have been singled out to bear a burden in the public interest.
Since public benefit and public injury cases tend to involve
particularized restrictions on properties with special characteristics, judges tend to proceed with greater care and to analyze, in more detail, whether these particular burdens are justified. The cases have not articulated precise levels of judicial
scrutiny that are applied in certain categories of disputes. The
Court may engage in an ad hoc, factual inquiry of sufficient
intensity to satisfy itself that the regulation is essentially fair.
In such cases, the relationship between the regulatory objective and the means chosen to accomplish it may be examined
more carefully. If judges are satisfied that the regulation prevents uses of property that are injurious to the public, a finding of fairness is more likely than when the regulation is based
on public values or sensibilities. In these latter cases, judges
are more likely to engage in multi-factor balancing of the public and private interests affected by the regulation, though
judges are not constrained to use any particular set of factors,
nor are they required to balance or weigh them in any preordained way.
The sum of the U.S. Supreme Court regulatory takings
case law is that the vast majority of regulations will be undisturbed by the courts, simply because judges are trained to defer to legislative determinations, absent a showing of essential
unfairness which is lacking in most cases. The much touted
ambiguity of the case law and the stricter standards applied
to regulations arise in very unusual fact situations such as the
total takings context, an invasion of possessory rights, or
rather obvious, in the Court's view, trammeling of fundamental rights. With some exceptions, this ambiguity and these
stricter rules will be limited to similar fact patterns.
IX.

The Principle of Maximum Fairness in Analyzing
Regulatory Takings Cases

When a court senses that it is dealing with a regulation
that places an undue burden on the property owner, its opin-
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ion focuses on the wrong to property; its sense of justice is
offended. Predictably, the public policy pronouncements of
the regulator enjoy less deference.
The majority opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court Lucas
decision illustrates the categorically different method of proceeding once a case is placed in the undue burden category. It
notes that in such a case "it is less realistic to indulge our
usual assumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life.' ",56 This is because
such regulations "carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service."" Even in these cases, where non-economic interests in
property are regulated, these regulations "invite exceedingly
close scrutiny under the Takings Clause. '58 The challenger
enjoys stricter judicial scrutiny of the regulation upon a showing that the regulation has "denied him economically benefi5' 9
cial use of his land.
The Lucas holding, therefore, should be confined to the
facts of the case, which the Court itself states are "relatively
rare." 60 There is ample precedent for takings analysis of the
Lucas variety in cases like Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV Corp." Although these previous cases do not
fall quite like the Scalia guillotine in Lucas, the basic holding
of Lucas is not a dramatic departure, if confined to cases
where the regulation truly takes all value.
The essential clue to a court that a regulation may be a
taking requiring compensation under the just compensation
clause is that the regulation has unfairly singled out a particular owner, or group of owners, to bear a public burden that
the public as a whole ought to be responsible for. It is this
clue from cases like Lucas that ought to be picked up by regulators and their attorneys if they wish to insulate their restric56. 112 S. Ct. at 2894, (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
57. Id. at 2895.
58. Id. at 2895 n.8.
59. Id. at 2893 n.6.
60. Id. at 2894.
61. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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tions on property from attack as regulatory takings. Should
they fail to do so, their ability to regulate property in the public interest may be limited by the legislature and their regulation may be found to violate the standards articulated in the
undue burden category of regulatory takings cases.
The practical lesson that may be learned from this is that
land use regulators should strive to achieve essential fairness
rather than relax into an assumed presumption of validity.
For a variety of reasons, those who draft regulations should be
guided by a principle of maximum fairness and engage, themselves, in the exercises undertaken by the courts in close
cases. Among these reasons are the following:
First, a regulatory regime that is generally fair might
seem unduly burdensome as applied to a particular owner,
triggering more careful judicial analysis, a takings finding and
public cost and embarrassment.
Second, because judges do enjoy leeways in this field, and
the rules in one category of case can bleed through to other
categories, there is no guarantee that a given set of facts will
be placed in a particular category.
Third, by proceeding fairly in regulating land uses, situations that lead courts and commentators to use phrases like
"out-and-out plan of extortion" and "predatory practices" can
be avoided along with the perception that land use regulation,
in general, has gone too far. Unless this happens, victories in
the courtroom can be negated in legislative chambers. The
Private Property Rights Act of 1991 would constrain the issuance of needed and useful regulations. Such legislative proposals are less likely to succeed if the need for them is not felt
by lawmakers.
Fourth, productive use of land is respected by the law.
Regulations that intrude on such uses only as far as necessary
to accomplish their environmental or other public objective
are less vulnerable to invalidation in the courts by judges
trained to respect private property rights as well as the discretion of legislatures.
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Supporting Justification

If a land use regulation is not supported by findings that
clearly demonstrate its public purpose and justify its private
burdens, judges will be thrown back on their own sense of
fairness. For this reason, regulations should always contain
detailed findings of fact that support their adoption and impacts. As Justice Scalia counselled, this needs "to be more
than an exercise in cleverness and imagination."" In justifying any regulation, or analyzing whether it is constitutional,
there are several key questions that are helpful to ask.
First, is the public objective pursued by the regulatory
scheme clearly stated and convincingly supported?
Second, is the close connection between the regulatory
means and the burdens imposed obvious on the face of the
regulation? Third, is it possible to characterize the regulatory
scheme as an arbitration matter? Are the burdens of the regulation shared by a relatively large number of property owners
including all similarly situated owners? Are there any special
benefits from the regulation that run to those owners? If a
relatively few owners are burdened, is there a convincing reason why this has to be so?
Fourth, does the regulation effect, directly or indirectly,
an invasion of the owner's possessory rights? Is there any
other alternative to accomplishing the regulatory end that
does not involve an invasion? If the regulation effects a result
that appears to constitute a traditional government enterprise, such as the preservation of open space, is there a convincing rationale for regulating rather than taking the property under eminent domain? Is there a possibility that the
regulation will prevent all productive use of particular properties? If so, could the use have been prevented under the
state's nuisance law or prevailing property law? Does the regulation have hardship exceptions to prevent total takings? If
not, is their absence justified?
62. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
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The Comprehensive Plan and the Principle of
Maximum Fairness

Judges will have fewer occasions to second-guess regulators when it is obvious, in the structure of the regulatory program, that considerable and comprehensive planning was involved. This is illustrated by Gardner v. New Jersey
Pinelands Commission. In Gardner, a property owner was
burdened by regulations that were drafted in response to federal and state legislation designed to protect the New Jersey
Pine Barrens. The breadth of concern in the legislation is considerable, despite its primary focus on the preservation of the
fragile ecosystem. The state authorized the designation of
"protection areas" for the promotion of agriculture and "appropriate patterns of compatible residential, commercial and
industrial development . . . ."" The Pinelands Commission
adopted land use regulations, based on and consistent with a
"comprehensive management plan," subject to the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior of the United States. In this regime, the legislature and its regulatory agency arbitrated a full
range of public concerns and private interests.
In Gardner the court quickly saw the analogy between
this regulatory approach and zoning: "Because the Pinelands
scheme is fundamentally a regime of zoning, takings doctrine
dealing with zoning is particularly relevant." 65 The court
noted that the regulation complained of had a particular impact on property with special characteristics, akin to the impacts of "complex, special-purpose regulations" where the demands of the judicial takings analysis "may become more
elaborate." 66 The tone of the court's analysis, in this dual context, was respectful of the legislative determinations involved.
Under the Pine Barrens program, the large-scale reciprocity of advantage in the regulatory scheme is inherent in its
concern for economic as well as ecological interests, paralleling
the breadth of concerns of zoning itself. As Justice Stevens
63.
64.
65.
66.

593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991).
Id. at 254-55. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 13:18A-9b.
593 A.2d at 257.
Id.
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writes in his dissent in Lucas, "[P]erhaps the most familiar
application of this principle of generality arises in zoning
cases. A diminution of value caused by a zoning regulation is
far less likely to constitute a taking if it is part of a general
and comprehensive land use plan.""
Many land use regulations are adopted and enforced by
public agencies that are either parochial or narrow in their focus. Local governments tend to be parochial, limited in their
concern to property and affairs within their limited geographical boundaries. State and federal environmental regulations
tend to focus narrowly on issues such as air quality, an estuary, an aquifer, specific wetlands, a scenic river, or a toxic
waste site. When these regulations stray from public injury
prevention, as the minority of the South Carolina Supreme
Court felt the Beachfront Management Act did in Lucas, they
risk invalidation under takings scrutiny. This risk is abated, if
they are part of a more comprehensive approach such as that
found in Gardner. Regulations that carry out objectives of a
comprehensive plan are more easily seen as being in accord
with the principle of generality, conferring reciprocal advantages, falling into the arbitration class and meriting the full
deference that reviewing courts afford such regulatory
programs.
With single-purpose regulations, emanating from state
and federal agencies, and with parochial local regulations, it is
less clear that the public interest is fully considered and that
the regulatory scheme, in balance, bestows reciprocal benefits
as broadly as possible. The lack of order in a system of uncoordinated regulations, some parochial, some narrow in focus,
is itself burdensome; developers' proposals are often subject to
multiple-agency reviews by different levels of government. It
is obvious that a comprehensive and coordinated system of
land use regulation furthers the essential fairness sought by
courts in examining regulations.
The relatively recent appearance of comprehensive statewide land use legislation, coinciding with the quickening pace
67. 112 S. Ct. at 2923.
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of regulatory takings challenges is intriguing. Such initiatives,
often called growth management statutes, generally require
that state and local regulations be tied to comprehensive land
use plans. Such plans consider, arbitrate, and represent a wide
variety of interests including economic and residential development, infrastructure provision, the provision of open space
and recreational facilities, and the protection of the environment, among others. This is the type of collaborative effort,
representing both property and environmental interests, that
is needed as an antidote to the rash of regulatory takings
cases and the emerging trend toward property rights
legislation.
In the typical growth management statute, state-wide
land use objectives are articulated and local plans are urged or
required to be consistent with those objectives. Emphasis is
placed on need analysis and data gathering, and the integration of that information into comprehensive plans. Information is often assembled at the regional level, and regulations
are tied to meeting those regional needs. The plans that result
tend to be comprehensive in subject matter and geographical
in focus, truly arbitrating a broad range of public and private
interests in a uniform fashion. The publicity attending the
consideration and adoption of such plans gives notice to property owners and purchasers of future allowable land cases.
These plans are then used as the justification for specific land
use regulations, such as zoning, at the local level. They also
guide the issuance of single-purpose regulations by state agencies, as well as the expenditure of local, state and federal
funds on capital infrastructure such as bridges, public transit,
highways and water and sewer systems.
When a regulation, challenged as a taking, is carefully integrated into such a comprehensive system of land use regulation, the natural tendency of judges toward deference to law
makers will be greatly reinforced. If there is a threat to the
potency of legislatures from stricter judicial scrutiny of land
use regulations, legislating comprehensively and intelligently
in this fashion and adhering to the principle of maximum fairness will keep control where it historically has been. Absent a
showing by a particular property owner of an egregious bur-
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den in her case, justices are more likely to behave as they did
in Gardner,deferring in tone and substance to the rule of law
as competently expressed by the elected representatives of the
people.
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